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BAPCPA AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT: WHO (SIC) 
DO YOU TRUST?1 
DAVID G. EPSTEIN2 
Trying to understand and apply the many different provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA) has caused people to yearn for the "good old days." At the 
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges' (NCBJ) Annual Meeting in 
San Antonio in October 2005, there was a lot of talk about the "good 
old days"3 and some singing "'bout the good old days" at the NCBJ 
"Final Night Dinner" by a larger than life (at least as large as Sally 
Struthers), Wynonna Judd.4 
And this has caused me to remember a daytime television show 
from my good old days: "Who Do You Trust?"5 BAPCPA is like this 
I. This article was prepared in November 2005 originally and exclusively for 
presentation to the 2006 North Carolina Banking Institute and publication in the North 
Carolina Banking Institute Journal. Feel free to use the stuff in this article however you 
wish, with the understanding that everything written in the article and said in my 
presentation is, at best, my best guess as to what the law is, or should be. 
2. I teach at the Dedman School of Law of Southern Methodist University, in Dallas, 
Texas and continue to have a relationship with the law firm of King & Spalding. I am 
grateful for the opportunities to work with the students at SMU and the lawyers at King & 
Spalding. I am grateful for the many other professional opportunities I have had; I am 
especially grateful to the University of North Carolina School of Law, which gave me my 
first opportunity to teach. 
3. Particularly from the "alter knockers," such as Leonard Gilbert and Bill Sullivan. 
4. See Wynonna: Official Worldwide Website, http://www.wynonna.com/ (Lyrics are 
available under "Music" then "Greatest Hits"). 
5. "Who Do You Trust?" was a daytime television series from 1957-62, starring 
Johnny Carson. See generally RONALD L. SMITH, JOHNNY CARSON - AN UNAUTHORIZED 
BIOGRAPHY (1987). I was a teenager then: watching television in the afternoon, 
"discovering" girls, and ... Definitely good old days. I understand (as do the law review 
editors) that this footnoted statement is a sentence fragment. One of the best teachers from 
my "good old days," my 10th grade English teacher Miss Lindemann, told me that I could 
use sentence fragments after I had a book published. 
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comedy/quiz show in (1) the poor choice of words in the title,6 and (2) 
the focus on whom is to be trusted7 to answer questions. 
The title "Who Do You Trust" is obviously grammatically 
incorrect. It is equally obvious that whatever BAPCP A is, it is not, as 
the title states, a "consumer protection act." 
Each afternoon on Who Do You Trust?, two contestants who 
did not necessarily know each other would decide which of the two 
would be trusted to answer a particular question. 8 In BAPCPA, 
Congress has repeatedly decided that it does not trust anyone to answer 
bankruptcy questions. 
I. CONGRESS'S LACK OF TRUST OF DEBTORS 
Congress's lack of trust in consumer debtors has already been 
documented and debated by others.9 New provisions requiring 
consumer education, documentation, and income and expense 
calculations are the most obvious examples. 10 BAPCPA is also rich in 
obvious examples of Congress's lack of trust of business debtors, large 
and small. 
6. "Who Do You Trust?" is, of course, grammatically incorrect. See BRYAN A. 
GARNER, THE REDHOOK: A MANUAL ON STYLE§ 10.3 (2002). Perhaps, the show's producer, 
Don Fedderson, had an English teacher who told him that he did not need to follow accepted 
rules of grammar ifhe ever had a network game show. 
7. This article uses the word "trust" in the same way that Professor Frank Cross uses 
the word in his new article that focuses on trust in economic transactions between private 
parties. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005) ("(T)he voluntary 
ceding of control over something valuable [or important] to another person or entity, based 
upon one's faith in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for the 
valuable thing."). 
8. The more interesting part of the show was Johnny Carson's pre-quiz conversations 
with the contestants. For example, "(a) body builder who was a contestant once cautioned 
Carson to respect his own body "the only house he'd ever have.' 'My house is pretty 
messy,' Carson retorted, 'but I have a woman come in once a week to clean it out."' PAUL 
CORKERY, CARSON: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 77 (1987). 
9. See generally Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: 
Representing Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005," 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 (2005). 
10. See generally Hon. Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was 
Advertised, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 67, 68-9 (2005). 
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A. Making the right decisions regarding management 
BAPCP A shows that Congress does not trust busi~ess debtors to 
make the "right" decisions regarding management. Or that Congress 
does not understand how decisions regarding management of a debtor in 
the "zone of insolvency" are made. 11 
1. Trustee 
New § 1104(e) requires the United States Trustee to move for 
the appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case when there are 
grounds to believe that there may be fraud or criminal conduct among 
the governing body of the debtor or among the executives whom chose 
the governing body in financial reporting. 12 
This provision does not change the standards the bankruptcy 
court is to apply in determining whether to appoint a trustee. The 
general "cause" standard in§ 1104(a) remains unchanged. 
Section 1104( e) does not even change the standards for a private 
party's filing a motion for the appointment of a trustee. Before and 
after BAPCP A, any party in interest may move for the appointment of a 
trustee in a Chapter 11 case because of "actual fraud." 
What has been changed is that now the United States Trustee 
must so move. Note the word "shall" in§ 1104(e). 13 
Note also the phrase "reasonable grounds to suspect." Section 
1104( e) is the only Bankruptcy Code provision to use that phrase. 
Other Bankruptcy Code sections use the phrase "reasonable cause to 
believe."14 Obviously, "reasonable grounds to suspect" is a lower 
standard. 
11. Officers and directors of corporations that are in the "zone of insolvency" now 
generally understand that they have expanded fiduciary duties that include the creditors. 
Helen Shaw, Fiduciary Duty in the Zone of Insolvency, CFO MAG., Aug. 25, 2005, at 1. 
And creditors of the corporation are generally included in major decisions regarding 
management. Id. 
12. 11 U.S.C. § ll04(e) (2005). ("The United States trustee shall move for the 
appointment of a trustee under subsection (a) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that 
current members of the governing body of the debtor, the debtor's chief executive or chief 
financial officer, or members of the governing body who selected the debtor's chief 
executive or chief financial officer, participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal 
conduct in the management of the debtor or the debtor's public financial reporting."). 
13. Id. 
14. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(12)(2005); § ll41(d)(5)(C) (2005). 
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While§ l 104(e) should not change a court's ruling on a motion 
to appoint a trustee, one could easily speculate that new § 1104( e) will 
result in the United States Trustee filing more motions for the 
appointment of a trustee, and will result in additional time-consuming, 
costly litigation. Other "ones" (but not me) have also speculated that § 
1104(e) could result in "increased pressure to act prepetition to remove 
CEOs and CFOs."15 
2. KERPs (Key Employee Retention Plans) 
Kmart is the "poster child" for reform of key employee retention 
plans. 16 Kmart filed for bankruptcy on January 22, 2002, and its CEO, 
Chuck Conaway, left the company less than two months later and was 
granted $4 million in severance. 17 After BAPCP A, no more Chuck 
Conaways as § 503(c) addresses company programs for post-petition 
payments to key executives. 18 It provides: 
[T]here shall neither be allowed, nor paid-
(1) a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the 
benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of 
inducing such person to remain with the debtor's 
business, absent a finding by the court based on 
evidence in the record that-
(A) the transfer or obligation is essential to retention of 
the person because the individual has a bona fide job 
offer from another business at the same or greater rate of 
compensation; 
(B) the services provided by the person are essential to 
the survival of the business; and 
15. Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: 
The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J 603, 620 (2005). 
16. See generally Allison K. Verderber Herriott, Toward an Understanding of the 
Dialetical Tensions Inherent in CEO and Key Employee Retention Plans During 
Bankruptcy, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 579 (2004). 
17. Nelson D. Schwartz, Greed-mart; Attention, Kmart Investors. The Company May 
Be Bankrupt, but Its Top Brass Have Been Raking It In, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002, at 139. 
18. A recent New York Times article on the Delphi Corporation bankruptcy 
"addressed" Delphi's KERP as "[t]ruly a Marie Antoinette moment." Gretchen Morgenson, 
Oohs and Ahs at Delphi's Circus, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005 (Late Edition), § 3, at I. 
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(C) either-
(i)the amount of the transfer made to, or obligation 
incurred for the benefit of, the person is not greater than 
an amount equal to 10 times the amount of the mean 
transfer or obligation of a similar kind given to 
nonmanagement employees for any purpose during the 
calendar year in which the transfer is made or the 
obligation is incurred; or 
(ii) if no such similar transfers were made to, or 
obligations were incurred for the benefit of, such 
nonmanagement employees during such calendar year, 
the amount of the transfer or obligation is not greater 
than an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount of any 
similar transfer or obligation made to or incurred for the 
benefit of such insider for any purpose during the 
calendar year before the year in which such transfer is 
made or obligation is incurred; 
(2) a severance payment to an insider of the debtor, 
unless-
( A) the payment is part of a program that is generally 
applicable to all full-time employees; and 
(B) the amount of the payment is not greater than 10 
times the amount of the mean severance pay given to 
nonmanagement employees during the calendar year in 
which the payment is made; or 
(3) other transfers or obligations that are outside the 
ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts 
and circumstances of the case, including transfers made 
to, or obligations incurred for the benefit of, officers, 
managers, or consultants hired after the date of the filing 
of the petition. 19 
61 
Note that the provision distinguishes among retention payments, 
covered in subsection (l); and severance payments, restricted in 
subsection (2); and other payments such as incentive bonus plans, 
regulated in subsection (3). 
19. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2005). 
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Don't feel guilty if you skimmed over or even skipped over 
most of the statutory provision. In dealing with retention payment 
programs, you can probably stop with the phrase "bona fide job offer 
from another business at the same or greater rate of compensation" in § 
503(c){l)(A).20 A failing company cannot have its key executives out 
looking for another job. And, a failing company might not want to keep 
a key executive who is offered another position at the "same or greater 
rate of compensation" with a company that is not failing and who is not 
smart enough to take that other job. 
In dealing with severance pay proposals, the key phrase in § 
503(c)(2) is "generally applicable to all full-time employees." No 
business can afford to pay all of its employees the kind of severance pay 
that its top management asks for. While a severance payment plan 
limited to employees with qualifying time tenure may qualify, a 
severance plan limited to employees with qualifying rank is likely to be 
disqualified. 
The new deal for key executives may well be "performance" 
incentive bonus plans, with the lowest possible qualifying thresholds. 
Such plans will be subject to the "justified by the facts and 
circumstances of the case" standard of§ 503(c)(3), the easiest of the 
three § 503( c) standards to meet. 
B. Making timely decisions 
Congress not only does not trust business debtors to make the 
right decisions about management, but also does not trust business 
debtors to make timely decisions. BAPCP A imposes new deadlines. 
1. Exclusivity 
Amended§ 1121(d) limits the time for decisions on Chapter 11 
plans. More specifically, the limitation on exclusivity is now eighteen 
months. At most, this will impact only the largest, most contentious 
cases.21 
20. § 503(c)(l)(a). 
21. David A. Skeel, Jr., Deja vu All Over Again in American Corporate Bankruptcy?, 
79 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NAT. CONF. OF BANKR. JUDGES, 12-7, 12-16 (2005) ("The new 
restrictions on exclusivity are puzzling in two respects. First, they seem to be responding to 
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2. Commercial real estate lease decisions22 
Until BAPCPA, a debtor had sixty days after the order for relief 
to decide whether to assume or reject a lease of commercial, i.e., 
"nonresidential," real estate. And, the prevailing practice was for 
extensions to be granted until the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. 
BAPCP A extends this initial period from sixty days to 120 
days. 23 More important, BAPCP A caps non consensual extension of the 
120-day period to ninety more days, a 210-day cap. This cap will affect 
more cases than the new cap on exclusivity. 
Consider the impact of this deadline on a retailer like Kmart that 
leases hundreds of stores.24 Is the first 210 days of a bankruptcy case 
enough time to make these business decisions? 
And consider the impact of this deadline on a debtor like United 
Airlines, Inc. that is using essential facilities under very complicated 
transactions that are structured as leases, but that may or may not be 
a by-gone problem . . . Second, the best recent evidence suggests that in relatively small 
cases at least, judges have made remarkably good decisions about when to turn off the 
spigot."). But see Alan M. Christenfeld & Shephard W. Melzer, 2005 Bankruptcy 
Amendments: A Secured Creditor's Perspective, N.Y.L.J. August 4, 2005, at 5. 
Id. 
The elimination of judicial discretion to grant extensions of exclusivity 
is likely to put increased pressure on debtors by inducing them to 
propose reorganization plans, and by transferring bargaining leverage to 
creditors and other parties in interest, at an earlier stage in the 
proceedings than previously. It conceivably might prove fatal to debtors 
that could reorganize given more time, especially in complex cases or 
where vulture investors are circling the debtor. Secured creditors that 
are at odds with a debtor may exploit the shortening of exclusivity to 
file a plan of reorganization themselves, or to encourage another party in 
interest to do so, despite opposition from the debtor. Different outcomes 
may occur, however, where debtors and their secured creditors are not 
in conflict and are cooperating to formulate a reorganization plan. The 
curtailment of debtor exclusivity could then pose unforeseen obstacles 
for the secured creditors by leaving them with weakened debtors and 
potentially involving them in confirmation and other battles with 
competing parties that might have been less emboldened or potent under 
current law. 
22. See generally Jordan Kirby, Note, Unexpired Leases Under the New Bankruptcy 
Act: A Win-Win for Landlords and Lenders? 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 377 (2006). 
23. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d)(4)(A). More precisely, the initial time period is now the earlier 
of 120 days after the order for relief or the date of an entry of an order confirming the plan. 
Id. 
24. See generally Brent Snavely & Jennette Smith, Slow Auction Leads Kmart to Give 
Up Sale of Most Leases, CRAIN'S DETRIOT Bus., June 24, 2002, at 3. 
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"true leases. "25 Is the first 210 days of a bankruptcy case enough time 
to resolve these difficult legal issues? 
BAPCP A somewhat limits the effect of this cap on the time for 
deciding whether to assume or reject by also imposing a cap on the 
burden to the estate from a "bad" assumption decision. New § 
503(b )(7) does three things: first, it recognizes the possibility that an 
assumed lease can be rejected later in the case, second, it provides that 
the damages from such later rejection will be a second priority 
administrative expense claim, but third, it caps any such priority to two 
years of future lease obligations. 26 
Note that § 365(d)(4) only limits the time for deciding whether 
to assume or reject commercial leases. There is no deadline for 
assignment decisions. Some debtors may be able to limit somewhat the 
effect of§ 365(d)(4) by obtaining an assumption order confirming that 
any decision as to whether to assign leases that have been timely 
assumed can be made later. 
25. Cf United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 
2005) ("The transaction between United and the CSCDA is not a 'true lease' under 
California law .... We do not doubt that many financing devices are 'true leases."'). 
26. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(7). New § 503(b)(7) also provides that the claim for any 
remaining amount due for the balance of the lease will be a claim subject to the cap in 
section 502(b)(6). Id 
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II. CONGRESS'S LACK OF TRUST OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES27 
The BAPCP A provisions considered in § 1 which reflect 
Congress's lack of trust of debtors also reflects Congress's lack of trust 
of bankruptcy judges.28 As Judge Keith Lundin, a bankruptcy judge for 
more than twenty years, wrote: 
27. Congress's lack of trust to make bankruptcy decisions is not limited to bankruptcy 
court judges. At the very least, this lack of trust extends to the judges who are involved in 
the formulation and approval of the Bankruptcy Rules. This lack of trust can be seen in the 
Rules Enabling Act. Professor Alan Resnick, who has served as a Reporter and as a 
member of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, explains: 
Section 2072 of Title 28 governs rulemaking relating to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Appellate Procedure, 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although these rules may not 
modify substantive rights,§ 2072(b) provides that "[a]ll laws in conflict 
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have 
taken effect." This provision, commonly called the "supersession 
clause," gives the Supreme Court flexibility in devising and amending 
procedural rules that will supersede any current statute that may be in 
conflict with them-so long as substantive rights are not affected. The 
advisory committees for these bodies of rules are not constrained by 
existing procedural statutory provisions in recommending changes to 
improve efficiency in case administration and judicial procedure .... The 
promulgation and amendment of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure are governed by § 2075, rather than § 2072. In contrast to § 
2072, § 2075 does not contain a supersession clause. Therefore, the 
Bankruptcy Rules are the only federal rules that may not conflict with a 
procedural statutory provision. 
The Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy-related sections of Title 28 of the 
United States Code contain many provisions that are procedural in nature. Alan 
N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 245, 262 
(1996). 
28. An important question that can be asked but not answered in November 2005, one 
month after the effective date of most BAPCP A provisions, is whether the perception of 
bankruptcy judges that BAPCPA reflects Congress's lack of trust of bankruptcy judges will 
affect bankruptcy court application and interpretation of BAPCPA provisions. In In re 
McNabb, Judge Haines held that the language "as a result of electing under subsection 
(b)(3)(A) to exempt property under state or local law" only applies to debtors in those 
relatively few states that allow debtors to elect between § 522(b) and state exemptions. 
Judge Haines looked to the "plain meaning" of the language only even though his plain 
meaning meant that the provision limited debtors only in the states of Minnesota and Texas. 
He did not consider legislative history or Congressional intent. 326 B.R. 785, 791 (Bankr. 
D. Ariz. 2005). However, in In re Kaplan, Judge Mark found that more than one plausible 
reading of Congress's words exists, looking to legislative history for Congress's intent. He 
also criticized the decision in McNabb: "[t]o arrive at this [the conclusion that the cap is 
limited to the states of Minnesota and Texas] based on a strained and convoluted use of 
statutory interpretation in the face of this unambiguous legislative intent is simply wrong.") 
331 B.R. 483, 487-88 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005). 
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BAPCP A arrived on a wave of anti-bankruptcy judge 
rhetoric. As if blaming the court system for too many 
people with debt trouble, BAPCP A is packed with 
provisions intended to "reduce the discretion" of 
bankruptcy judges .... 
You can bet the lobbyists who delivered BAPCP A will 
be the first to claim it is the bankruptcy (non)judges who 
are impeding and distorting all their good work.29 
If Judge Lundin had written this article after his semester 
teaching at the University of New Mexico School of Law,30 he might 
have made the same point using the mud/crystal language31 now in 
vogue in the academy.32 For example, Professor A. Mechele Dickerson, 
an outstanding young33 bankruptcy professor at the University of Texas 
Law School, has opined 
Legislators, and some academic commentators, seem 
highly distrustful of bankruptcy judges' ability to 
properly exercise judicial discretion .... Congress and 
other bankruptcy critics seem to prefer clear, inflexible 
"crystalline" rules that severely limit a court's ability to 
29. Lundin, supra note 10, at 69; see also Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy 
Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 559, 561 (2001). This 
distrust of judges is evident in the recent bankruptcy reform efforts and in recent bankruptcy 
scholarship of the "Law and Economics" stripe. These legislators and scholars use the 
supposed incompetence of bankruptcy judges as a principal basis for arguments in favor of 
limiting the goals of bankruptcy law and curbing the discretion of bankruptcy judges. 
Indeed, some recent bankruptcy scholarship carries this disenchantment with bankruptcy 
judges even further, seeking to make bankruptcy law irrelevant by reducing it to a set of 
contractual default rules. Lundin, supra note 10, at 69. 
30. Professor Lundin will be teaching at the University of New Mexico Law School 
during the first half of 2006. See http://lawschool.unm.edu/faculty/lundin/index.php (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2005). 
31. Most of the law review articles that use this terminology refer to Carol M. Rose, 
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 604-05 (1988) (developing 
mud/crystal terminology to describe rules of property law). 
32. The phrase "in the academy" is also in vogue in the academy. E.g., Ernest A. 
Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 152 (2005); 
David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1699, 1794 (2005). 
33. I.e., younger than me. 
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make fact-based decisions over flexible "muddy" rules 
that give courts considerably more discretion.34 
67 
While the examples that Professor Dickerson and Judge Lundin 
use to illustrate Congress's lack of trust of bankruptcy judges are the 
obvious Chapter 7 /Chapter 13 provisions affecting consumer debtors, 
there are also important examples of BAPCP A adding "crystalline 
rules" or replacing "standards" with "rules"35 that affect business cases 
in Chapters 3, 5, and 11. 
A. A New (And Very "Muddy" Rule) for Goods Delivered Within 
Twenty Days Before Bankruptcy 
New§ 503(b)(9) creates a new administrative priority for goods 
received by the debtor within twenty days prior to the petition date. It 
is necessary to see what§ 503(b)(9) says (and does not say) in order to 
see how "muddy" this "crystalline" rule is: 
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed 
administrative expenses, ... , including-
(9) the value of any goods received by the debtor within 
20 days before the date of commencement of a case 
34. A. Mechele Dickerson, Approving Employee Retention and Severance Progams: 
Judicial Discretion Run Amuck?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. REv. 93, 104-05 (2003); see also 
Janger, supra note 29, at 623. 
Id. 
Muddy rules that confer discretion on judges in contexts where abusive 
or inefficient non-cooperative behavior raise the cost of opting out of 
the bankruptcy case. This dynamic operates even where we have no 
confidence that bankruptcy judges are capable of identifying abuse. 
Even where judges have limited capacity, the costs of litigation 
associated with the open-textured rule will operate as an incentive to 
cooperate. Moreover, this is not just true in the cases where the parties 
actually litigate. It will also be true any time a party considers unilateral 
action. Thus, when legislators and law reformers speak of eliminating 
statutory ambiguity or of limiting judicial discretion, they should 
recognize that increased statutory specificity may reduce the extent to 
which broad statutory policies are incorporated into the behavior and 
thinking of the parties subject to statutory regulation. 
35. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381-83 
(1985) (exploring of the differences between "standards" and "rules"). 
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under this title in which the goods have been sold to 
the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's 
business.36 
The most obvious questions are created by what is not said 
about "value."37 For example, is value measured as of the time of the 
delivery, the time of the petition, or the time of the payment? Value to 
whom: the seller or the debtor? Replacement value or resale value? 38 
Note also what is not said in § 503(b)(9) about the "prior rights 
of a holder of a security interest in such goods." The new § 546(c) 
provision on reclamation, discussed more fully in § III (B)(4), contains 
this limiting phrase.39 Section 503(b)(9) does not. 
Accordingly, it seems that the seller has an administrative 
priority in the value of the delivered goods even though another creditor 
has a security interest that reaches the delivered goods. In essence, the 
estate could be paying twice for goods delivered to the debtor within 
twenty days of bankruptcy: (1) to the lender with a floating lien on all of 
the debtor's inventory, and (2) to the seller who now has an 
administrative priority. 
And consider the relationship of new § 503(b )(9) with § 
546( c) and other Bankruptcy Code concepts and provisions. A vendor 
who delivers goods within twenty days of bankruptcy can satisfy the 
requirements of both §§ 503(b)(9) and 546(c). There is nothing in 
either§§ 503(b)(9) or 546(c) that indicates that a vendor who meets the 
requirements of both § 503(b )(9) and 546( c) is limited to reclamation 
or an administrative priority. 
36. 11 u.s.c. § 503(b)(9) (2005). 
37. Other possible litigable issues under new section 503(b)(9) include what are 
"goods" and what is in the "ordinary course." 
38. Elsewhere, BAPCPA is more "crystalline" about value. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2). 
[V]alue . . . shall be determined based on the replacement value of such 
property as of the date of the filing of the petition without deduction for costs 
of sale or marketing. With respect to property acquired for personal, family, 
or household purposes, replacement value shall mean the price a retail 
merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and 
condition of the property at the time value is determined. Id 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2005). Section 546(c) contains other limiting language that 
does not appear in § 503(b)(9). Section 546(c) expressly requires that the debtor "received 
such goods while insolvent." Id. 
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Finally, consider what is not said in § 503(b )(9) about the time 
of payment. A basic concept of Chapter 11 is that payment of claims, 
including administrative priorities, are not paid until confirmation of the 
plan. There is nothing in § 503(b )(9) that indicates an earlier payment 
is necessary or permissible.40 
If § 503(b )(9) payments are treated like other payments for 
administrative obligations and deferred, it would seem that "critical 
vendors" will still be persuading debtors to persuade judges to enter a 
first day order authorizing their payment.41 Will this new statutory 
priority make it more difficult to persuade bankruptcy judges to enter 
orders authorizing immediate payment to "critical vendors?" 
If so, consider the relationship of§ 503(b )(9) with §§ 1129(a)(9) 
and 547. Section 1129(a)(9) requires that a Chapter 11 plan pay 
administrative priorities in full in cash on the effective date of the plan. 
Does that mean that a pre-bankruptcy payment to a vendor will not be a 
§ 547(b) preference because it merely enabled the creditor to be paid 
sooner, and not to "receive more" as required by§ 547(b)(5)?42 
40. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(l)(B) with 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9). Note the word 
"promptly" in the former but not the latter. See also § 365(d)(2) and (5) (setting a time for 
the payment with the word "timely"). 
41. Victor A. Vilaplana & Seltzer Caplan McMahon Vitek, The Rebellion Continues: 
Practicalities Override Precedent in Critical Vendor Motions, 877 PLI/COMM. 439, 445 
("Notwithstanding In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004), debtors' counsel continue to 
ask for and bankruptcy courts' [sic] continue to approve first day motions to pay prepetition 
unsecured claims prior to plan confirmation, including so-called critical vendors."). 
42. See generally Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Zenith Industrial and the 
Critical-Vendor Preference Defense, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32 (2005); cf In re Hayes 
Lemmerz Int'!, Inc., 313 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) ("[t]he payments at issue 
here were not made under the Critical Vendor Order; rather, they were made before the 
Critical Vendor Motion was filed and before the Critical Vendor Order was entered. 
Therefore, the payments at issue are not protected by the Order."). 
Even more generally, these questions suggest that I used the wrong adjective in titling this 
section of the article. Perhaps I should have used the word "fuzzy" instead of "muddy." 
See Jack F. Wiliams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as 
Applied to lntercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 . 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1406 (1994) 
Fuzzy logic permits us to expand our metaphorical thinking about the law. 
Experience teaches that there are many degrees of "correctness" or "trueness." 
Oftentimes, the quality of "correctness" or "trueness" depends on one's 
perspective .... Fuzzy logic permits us to escape the shackles of a confining 
metaphor steeped in formal logic, to rethink legal issues with a greater array of 
answers with their own degrees of acceptability. The foundation of fuzzy logic 
is fuzzy set theory. Aristotelian or formal logic recognizes statements as only 
true or false. In contrast, fuzzy set theory recognizes partial membership in one 
or more sets at the same time. Fuzzy set theory abolishes the law of the 
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B. A Crystalline New Rule for Assuming Leases and Other 
Contracts Notwithstanding a Historic Nonmonetary Default 
A business's leases and other contracts can be a major part of 
the collateral for the credit and thus a major factor in a decision whether 
to extend credit. Accordingly, the question of whether a debtor can 
retain (i.e., "assume") or sell (i.e., "assign") its unexpired leases or 
unperformed (i.e., "executory") contracts notwithstanding bankruptcy is 
an important question to commercial bankers. 
It is clear from § 365(b) that a debtor must "cure" defaults in 
order to assume or assign.43 What was not "crystalline" clear until 
BAPCP A 44 is whether a debtor could assume a lease or executory 
contract even though there had been a "nonmonetary default," such as 
"going dark,"45 that could not be cured. Section 365(b)(l)(A) now 
expressly deals with nonmonetary defaults:46 
Id. 
(b)(l) If there has been a default in an executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may 
excluded middle in formal set theory. Whereas formal set theory insists that a 
variable be either in or out of the set, fuzzy set theory permits a variable to be 
in and out of the set simultaneously, usually by reducing the quality of a 
variable to a qualitative relation. For example, the fuzzy set of blue swans 
admits any swan that is less than totally blue, because blue becomes a 
qualitative property-a matter of degree. The pale blue swan is therefore both 
in and out of the set. 
43. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LA w OF BANKRUPTCY 613 (Foundation Press 
1997). 
44. For a review of the law prior to BAPCPA, see generally William P. Weintraub, 
Historical Defaults and Cross-Defaults: Here a Default, There a Default, Everywhere a 
Default, Default, Default, 26 CAL. BANKR. J. 286 (2003). 
45. Cf In re The Ground Round, Inc., No. 04-11235-WCH, 2004 WL 1732207, at *7 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) ("[A]ny continuous operations provision or 'going-dark' clause, or 
similar clause prohibiting the cessation of operations at the leased premises is unenforceable 
against the assignee thereof under Section 365(f)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code and, with 
respect to a New Restaurant Location real estate lease, is not a valid restriction on use as 
contemplated under Section 365(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code for a period of one 
hundred eighty (180) days following the Closing."). 
46. The Bankruptcy Code now uses, but does not define, the phrase "nonmonetary 
obligations." Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, a bankruptcy partner in the Denver office of Holland 
& Hart, suggests the following examples of what might constitute a monetary default: 
"[b ]reaches such as the failure to maintain certifications or licenses, to maintain specified 
quality or qualification standards, to provide information and to operate continuously 
without closure." Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, Bankruptcy Reform and Nonmonetary Defaults -
What Have They Done Now?, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6, 6 (2005). 
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not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of 
assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee -
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the 
trustee will promptly cure, such default other than a 
default that is a breach of a provision relating to the 
satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or 
penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any 
failure to perform nonmonetary obligations under an 
unexpired lease of real property, if it is impossible for 
the trustee to cure such default by performing 
nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption, 
except that if such default arises from a failure to 
operate in accordance with a nonresidential real property 
lease, then such default shall be cured by performance at 
and after the time of assumption in accordance with 
such lease, and pecuniary losses resulting from such 
default shall be compensated in accordance with the 
provisions of this paragraph.47 
71 
As Judge Richard Posner wrote in In re Handy Andy Home 
Improvement Centers, Inc., "[s]tatutory language like other language 
should be read in context. The context consists not merely of other 
sentences but also of the real-world situations to which the language 
pertains . . . . When context is disregarded, silliness results.''48 How 
would you use the statutory provision set out above to answer the 
following questions about a "real-world situation to which" § 365(b) 
pertains?49 
47. 11 U.S.C. 365(b)(l)(A) (2005). Language was also added to section l 124.(2)(A), 
(D). Alan N. Resnick & Henry J Sommer, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005: A Section-by-Section Analysis, 2005 SUPPLEMENT 
COLLIER PORTABLE PAMPHLET XLIII (2005) ("Similar kinds of provisions on the obligation to 
cure nonmonetary defaults are added to section 1124(2) with respect to the impairment of a 
class of claims."). For a review of the legislative process that led to section 365(b)(l)(A), 
see generally David G. Epstein & Lisa Normand, "Real World" and Academic Questions 
About "Non-monetary Obligations Under the 2005 Version of 365(b) ", _AMER. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV._ (2006). The next paragraph in the text is the only paragraph of text that 1 
"borrowed" from the ABI article. And it is one of the ABI article paragraphs that 1 wrote. 
48. Matter of Handy Andy Home Improvement Centers, Inc., 144 F.3d 1125, 1128 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
49. I have been looking for an opportunity to use "pertain" in a law review article. 
Since 1971 (the year I started my teaching career as a "baby professor' at the University of 
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Debtors operated a General Motors (GM) automobile dealership 
in a building leased from Landlord. On November 7, 2005, Debtors 
ceased operating their automobile dealership. The bankruptcy cases 
were not filed until November 20, 2005. The GM Dealer Agreement 
and the lease with Landlord each provided that the failure to operate the 
business for seven consecutive business days was an event of default. 
Debtors' failure to operate the dealership for two weeks preceding the 
bankruptcy filing constituted a nonmonetary default - "a 'historical 
fact' [that], by definition, cannot be cured."50 
Notwithstanding the noncurable default under the lease, Debtors 
can, at least "in theory," assume Landlord's lease because "an unexpired 
lease of real property" comes within the "other than" language that 
BAPCPA added to§ 365(c)(l)(A). Debtors cannot however assume the 
GM franchise agreement. Only "an unexpired lease of real property" 
comes within the "other than" language. 
In the preceding paragraph, I used the "weasel words,"51 "in 
theory" with respecUo Debtors' assumption of the lease with Landlord 
because the "other than" language requires "performance at and after 
the time of assumption. "52 How can Debtors' continue to operate their 
North Carolina School of Law), the word "pertain" has appeared in the Harvard Law 
Review 152 times (isn't Westlaw wonderful) and my words have yet to appear in the 
Harvard Law Review. 
50. In re Claremont Acquisition Corp., 113 F.3d 1029, 1033-35 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that debtors could not assume the franchise agreement because they were required 
but unable to cure the nonmonetary default). The First Circuit reached a different decision 
in Jn re Bankvest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291, 301 (1st Cir. 2004), holding that a debtor is 
not required to cure a nonmonetary default. But cf Ralph Brubaker, Cure of Nonmonetary 
Defaults as a Prerequisite to Assumption of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: A 
Lesson in the Nature and Function of the Cure Requirement, 24 BANKRUPTCY LA w LETTER 
No. 12 p. 1 (December 2004) (making a persuasive argument based on contract law 
principles and stating that "[t]he notion that most (if not all) nonmonetary defaults are 
incurable is therefore misguided"); see also James I. Stang, Assumption of Contracts and 
Leases: The Obstacle of the Historical Default, 24 CAL. BANKR. J. 39 (1998). 
51. A weasel word is a word that avoids forming a clear position on an issue. Theodore 
Roosevelt once said in a speech: 
One of our defects as a nation is a tendency to use what have been 
called weasel words. When a weasel sucks eggs, it sucks the meat out 
of the egg and leaves it an empty shell. If you use a weasel word after 
another there is nothing left of the other. 
BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE (Oxford University Press 2003). 
52. The "other than" language in§ 365(b)(l)(A) also requires payment for "pecuniary 
losses resulting from such default." 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(l)(A). Note that § 365(b)(l)(B) 
contains almost identical language. I "noticed" that for almost a paragraph in David G. 
Epstein & Lisa Normand, "Real World" and "Academic Questions About "Nonmonetary 
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business on Landlord's premises as required by the lease agreement 
with Landlord if Debtors' business is a GM franchise and Debtor 
cannot assume its franchise agreement without curing a historical fault 
that is "impossible" to cure? Another way of asking the same question 
is how can a lender make an asset-based loan to a business debtor 
whose assets are based on a franchise agreement? 
And the same questions can arise in connection with an 
equipment lease. What if an equipment lease requires that the lessee 
maintain insurance and there was a brief period of time, prior to the 
lessee's bankruptcy filing, in which the insurance lapsed? In new § 
365(b)(l)(A), Congress treats equipment leases like executory contracts 
not like real estate leases. 
A different question that debtors in historical default on 
important equipment leases or franchise agreements might raise is 
whether the default is sufficiently "material" to preclude assumption. 
The word "material" is not a part of the BAPCPA § 365(b )(1 )(A); was 
not a part of the pre-BAPCPA § 365(b)(l)(A). Nonetheless, there is 
some pre-BAPCPA authority for requiring cure under section 
365(b)(l)(A) only ifthe default is material.53 
A recent law review article by two bankruptcy partners in the 
New York office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom suggests a 
still different strategy for debtors with equipment lease or franchise 
agreement problems under BAPCP A. "Rather, the debtor may choose 
neither to assume nor to reject, leaving open the possibility of post-
emergence litigation over whether the nondebtor party may terminate 
the contract or lease under applicable nonbankruptcy laws."54 
There is some support for this strategy. Under § 365(d), a 
Chapter 11 debtor does not have to assume or reject an executory 
Obligations" Under the 2005 Version of 365(b), _AMER. BANKR. INST. L. J. _ (2006). 
53. E.g., In re Whitsett, 163 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) ("[l]t is clear that a 
bankruptcy court has 'some latitude' in determining whether provisions in a debtor-tenant's 
lease may be deemed waived and their compliance be deemed insignificant in the 
assumption process. The determining factor appears to be the 'materiality' of the default in 
issue.") (citation omitted); In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 841 F.2d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988) 
("[T]he bankruptcy court found the alleged nonmonetary defaults were not of sufficient 
substance to preclude assumption of the lease. This finding is not clearly erroneous."); 
Brubaker, supra note 50, at 1 ("the concept of the 'cure' of defaults, by its very nature, is a 
material breach concept"). 
54. Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 15, at 626. 
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contract or equipment lease until confirmation of the plan. 55 And, a 
recent law review article indicates, there is case law that an unassumed 
executory contract can "ride through" a bankruptcy case. 56 
C. New Muddy Rules for Small Business Cases 
For years,57 law professors and real lawyers believed that the 
"S" in small business cases should be capitalized because of the 
pioneering work of North Carolina's Judge Thomas Small.58 There 
55. 11 u.s.c. § 365(d)(2) (2005). 
56. Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 15, at 626 (citing In re Hernandez, 287 B.R. 
795 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002)). See generally Mette H. Kurth & Joel Ohlgren, Ride Through 
Revisited (Again): The Strategic Use of the Ride-through Doctrine in the Post-Catapult Era, 
24-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 60-61 (2005). 
57. See generally Josef Athanas, Expediting the Administration of the Estate in Chapter 
11. 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 103, 115 (January/February 1999). From 1978 until 1994, 
there were no special provisions for small business debtors in the Bankruptcy Code, only 
special procedures in some bankruptcy courts. The 1994 amendments, Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), gave chapter 11 debtors who had 
$2,000,000 or less in liquidated debts the option of dispensing with creditors' committees, 
and opting for a fast-track to confirmation through the ability to combine a disclosure 
statement hearing with a hearing on plan confirmation. Id. "In 1994, partly in response to 
the positive results achieved by Judge Small and other judges in speeding the administration 
of the estate in smaller cases by combining the disclosure statement approval and plan of 
reorganization confirmation hearings, Congress amended sections 105 and 1125 of the 
Bankruptcy Code." id. 
58. See Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First 
Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and 
Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 190 n.86 (2000). 
Id. 
By now, most bankruptcy professionals are familiar with the 'fast-track' 
procedures pioneered by Judge A. Thomas Small, Jr. in the Eastern 
District of North Carolina to streamline and expedite the process for 
small businesses. Judge Small did lobby Congress to codify a special 
reorganization chapter, but the failure of Congress to respond has not 
impeded the efforts of Judge Small to adapt the present statute to the 
needs of particular types of cases and Judge Small's model has been 
followed across the country. 
See also George W. Hay, Lawyers Overwhelmingly Endorse Judge Small's "Fast Track" 
11 's, TURNAROUND AND WORKOUTS, July 15, 1989, at l; See generally Bernard Trujillo, 
Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 
483, 533. 
In self-organizing systems, norms emerge through a complex process of 
selection. Sometimes norms emerge when actors imitate a particular 
innovation known for its excellence at resolving a problem. An example 
of this sort of norm emergence is the spread of "fast-track" procedures 
for small business bankruptcies that were developed in the Eastern 
District of North Carolina. This particular form has spread to many 
other jurisdictions. 
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were Small (as in Judge Small) business bankruptcy cases - cases that 
Judge Small made work through flexible procedures. The new 
BAPCP A rules for small business debtors, at best, simply make for 
more work- more work that must be done more quickly. 
There are five sections of BAPCP A that require enhanced 
reporting by "small business debtors."59 And BAPCPA has amended 
two other sections to require that small business debtors reorganize 
more quickly. 
Section 1121 requires that small business debtors file the plan 
and disclosure statement not later than 300 days after the order for 
relief.60 And, under § 1129, the plan must be confirmed within forty-
five days after it is filed. 61 A bankruptcy judge can extend these 
deadlines only if the debtor "(A) ... demonstrates by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it is more likely than not that the court will confirm 
a plan within a reasonable period of time; (B) a new deadline is imposed 
at the time the extension is granted; and (C) the order extending time is 
signed before the existing deadline has expired. "62 
Under BAPCP A, neither a bankruptcy judge like Judge Small 
nor the debtor will be able to decide whether the debtor would benefit 
Id. 
59. See Bruce A. Markell, Small Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, SL068 ALI-AB A 263, 268 (2005). 
One theme of the small business amendments is that creditors deserve 
more and better information, presented in understandable and 
recognizable formats. Many sections of the small business amendments 
were framed with this goal in mind. In particular, there are five sections 
that require enhanced reporting in some way by small business debtors: 
(!)Section 419, regarding increased reporting of the assets and 
operations of any entity, including a closely-held corporation, in which 
the debtor holds a substantial or controlling interest; 
(2)Section 433, which directs the national Bankruptcy Rules Committee 
to prepare standard forms of disclosure statements and plans of 
reorganization for small business debtors; 
(3) Section 434, which would add section 308 to the Bankruptcy Code 
regarding periodic reporting of financial operations by small business 
debtors; 
(4) Section 435, which specifically directs the National Bankruptcy 
Rules Committee to develop forms to implement new section 308; and 
(5)Section 436, which would add section 1116 to the Bankruptcy Code 
regarding enhanced filing and other duties of small business debtors. 
60. 11 U.S.C. § 112l(e)(2) (2005). 
61. § 1129(e). 
62. § l 121(e)(3); § 1129(e)(2005). 
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from these new expedited procedures. Congress has already made that 
decision. Sort of. 
The small business provisions are no longer elective. All 
Chapter 11 debtors that meet the new § 101 definition of "small 
business debtor"63 must comply the BAPCP A small ousiness debtor 
requirements. 
The new definition of "small business debtor" contains two 
separate requirements: (1) a debt requirement and (2) a creditors' 
committee requirement. Looking first at the debt requirement, if the 
debt is no more than $2 million64 at the time of the filing of the petition, 
then look at whether there is a creditors' committee and whether the 
creditors' committee is active.65 The debt requirement can be finally 
resolved at the time of the petition. 
The creditors' committee requirement can be more troublesome. 
As Judge Bruce Markell has observed, 
[A ]ll chapter 11 debtors who are within the applicable 
debt limits will commence their cases as small business 
cases. They may lose that status, however, if a 
committee is formed, but may regain it if that committee 
isn't doing its job. The chameleon-like character of the 
definition takes on heightened importance, given the 
different duties, obligations, and burdens the small 
business debtor faces. 66 
Ill.CONGRESS'S LACK OF TRUST OF CONGRESS 
Before adjourning for 2005, Congress had time to "clear" 
professional baseball player Rafael Palmeiro of perjury. 67 Congress did 
not, however, have time to "clear up" BAPCPA. Congress's failure to 
63. § 101(51D). 
64. Id In applying the "not more than $2,000,000" requirement look only at 
"liquidated" debt. § 101(51D)(A). 
65. § 101(5ID)(A). The statutory language is,"[A] case in which the United States 
trustee has not appointed under section l 102(a)(l) a committee of unsecured creditors or 
where the court has determined that the committee of unsecured creditors is not sufficiently 
active and representative to provide effective oversight of the debtor." Id. 
66. See Markell, supra note 59, at 268. 
67. Richard Sandomir, Report: No Evidence of Perjury by Palmeiro, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2005, at DI. 
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correct "typos" and confusing language during the 2005 legislative 
process and since the enactment of BAPCP A suggests that Congress no 
longer trusts Congress to make decisions about bankruptcy. 
A. Proofing problems 
As the editors of the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal 
can attest, I cannot find the proofing problems in my own manuscript. 
Nonetheless, even I can find examples of proofing problems in 
BAPCPA. 
1. New ground for relief from stay 
For example, § 362(d)(4) uses a new phrase to create a new 
basis for relief with respect to real property collateral - "filing of the 
petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud." Elsewhere 
in the Bankruptcy Code68 and other federal statutes,69 Congress uses the 
phrase "hinder, delay, or defraud." Do you think that Congress could 
have intended to create a new, higher standard? Of more immediate 
importance, do you think that a bankruptcy judge could look solely at 
the "plain meaning" of what Congress said and not consider what 
Congress must have intended? 
2. Utility service 
Your tum. What is the time deadline for providing adequate 
assurance to utilities under newly revised § 366 set out in pertinent part 
below? Section 366: 
b) Such utility may alter, refuse, or discontinue service 
if neither the trustee nor the debtor, within 20 days after 
the date of the order for relief, furnishes adequate 
assurance of payment, in the form of a deposit or other 
security, for service after such date .... 
c) ... 
68. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32A) (2005); § 522(0); § 548(a)(l)(A) § 727(a)(2). 
69. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2005); 28 U.S.C. 3302 (2005). 
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(2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), with respect to a 
case filed under chapter 11, a utility referred to in 
subsection (a) may alter, refuse, or discontinue utility 
service, if during the 30-day period beginning on the 
date of the filing of the petition, the utility does not 
receive from the debtor or the trustee adequate assurance 
of payment for utility service that is satisfactory to the 
utility.70 
If a utility receives a cash deposit more than twenty days but 
less than thirty days after the debtor files its Chapter 11 petition, can the 
utility discontinue service? Is the right number twenty or is it thirty? 
Does the phrase "a case filed under chapter 11" which appears in 
BAPCPA added§ 366(c)(2), but not§ 366(b)(l) mean that the thirty is 
the right number for chapter 11 cases and twenty is the right number for 
cases under other chapters? What is the number of cases under other 
chapters in which there will be an issue of utility service under § 366? 
Read the provisions more carefully. Section 366(b) measures 
the twenty days from the "order for relief' while § 366( c) refers to a 
thirty-day period beginning on the date of the "filing of the petition."71 
In involuntary cases, there is a difference between "order for relief' and 
"filing of the petition." 
And, read even more carefully. How important is it that the 
phrase "satisfactory to the utility" appears only in§ 366(c)(2)?72 
70. 11 U.S.C. 366(b) & (c) (2005). 
71. Id. 
72. See In re Lucre, Inc., 333 B.R. 151 (Banlcr. W.D. Mich. 2005). 
Debtor requests that I continue the subsection (a) injunction with respect 
to Consumers Energy, Sprint and IXC notwithstanding subsection (c) 
because of their failure to respond to its offers of adequate assurance. 
However, subsection (c) does not give me that discretion, for it clearly 
requires as a condition to continuing the injunction either the utility's 
acceptance of the adequate assurance offered by the Chapter 11 trustee 
or debtor in possession or the Chapter 11 trustee's or debtor in 
possession's acceptance of the adequate assurance offered by the utility. 
Granted, subsection (c)(3) does give the trustee or debtor in possession 
the right to have the adequate assurance payment modified by the court. 
However, that right arises only after the adequate assurance payment 
has been agreed upon by the parties. In other words, the trustee or 
debtor in possession has no recourse to modify the adequate assurance 
payment the utility is demanding until the trustee or debtor in possession 
actually accepts what the utility proposes. 
2006] BANKRUPTCY 79 
Regardless of how carefully you read§ 366 - you can read it so 
carefully that you are willing to discuss it in an article in the American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal - you are still going to conclude that "[i]t is 
unclear how soon the debtor-in-possession must furnish adequate 
assurance of payment to the utility under BAPCPA."73 
B. Placement Problems 
1. Credit counseling and involuntary petitions 
Section 109, as its title indicates, deals with the question of 
"who may be a debtor." Prior to BAPCPA, nothing in the § 101 
definition of "debtor" or in § 109 distinguished between debtors in 
voluntary cases and debtors in involuntary cases. 
BAPCP A adds a requirement of budget and credit counseling 
for individuals.74 New subsection (h) to § 109 now provides - "an 
individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual 
has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the 
petition by such individual, received ... " 
It can be argued that the above language means that Congress 
has created a new defense to involuntary petitions against individuals 
such that creditors cannot file an involuntary petition against an 
individual unless and until she has completed the required counseling. 
This argument is consistent with the notion that all of the rest of§ 109 
applies to both voluntary and involuntary cases - noscitur a sociis.75 
Id. 
This opinion also distinguished between the word "service" in § 366(b) and the phrase 
"utility service" in § 366( c )(2). Id. 
73. Levin & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 15, at 608. But see Marcia Goldstein & 
Victoria Vron, Current Issues in Debtor in Possession Financing, ALI-ABA CHAPTER 11 
BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS, June 9-11, SK092 ALl-ABA 115, 151 (2005). 
Id. 
Currently, section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a utility 
company may alter, refuse, or discontinue service to the DIP if the DIP 
does not provide adequate assurance of payment within 20 days after the 
date of the order for relief, in the form of a deposit or other security. 
Although section 417 of the 2005 Act extends the time within which the 
DIP has to provide adequate assurance of payment to 30 days .... 
74. John D. Hurst, Note, Consumer Protection Issues: Protecting Consumers from 
Consumer Credit Counseling, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 159, 170 (2005). 
75. State v. Merino, 81 Haw. 198, 915 P.2d 672, 691 (1996) ("[T]he canon of 
construction denominated noscitur a sociis . . . may be freely translated as 'words of a 
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A different argument can be made by focusing on the phrase "by 
such individual" § 109(h) applies only to petitions filed by the debtor. 76 
This argument is consistent with the notion that courts should give 
meaning to all words in a statute.77 
Isn't this an unnecessary issue to argue? Is there a better place 
for the credit counseling requirement for individuals filing voluntary 
petitions than § 109? 
2. Asset sales by unprofitable for-profit corporations and the law of 
non-profits 
And isn't there a better place for the phrase "not a moneyed, 
business or commercial corporation or trust" than at the end of § 
363(d)(l). After BAPCPA, that section reads: 
( d) The trustee may use, sell, or lease property under 
subsection (b) or ( c) of this section only -
(1) in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law 
that governs the transfer of property by a corporation or 
trust that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial 
corporation or trust; 
As written and set out above, it can be argued that § 363(d)(l) 
requires all sales in bankruptcy - even sales by for profit debtors such as 
GM - must comply with the non-bankruptcy law regulating non-profit 
corporations and trusts. Again, there is a counter-argument: 
nonbankruptcy law governing non-profits is not "applicable" law as that 
word is used in § 363(d)(l) when the debtor is GM or some other 
ostensibly for profit business entity. Again, enacting "technical 
amendments" could eliminate an unnecessary argument caused by 
where BAPCP A language has been placed. 
feather flock together,' that is, the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it 
keeps."). 
76. See Bruce C. Scalambrino, Bankruptcy Reform for Non-Bankruptcy Lawyers, 93 
ILL B. J. 518, 522-23 (2005). 
77. Negonsott v. Sanniels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993). 
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3. Small business debtor reporting 
Section 308 details the filing requirements for a "small business 
debtor." Under§ 103, Chapter 3 provisions are applicable in Chapter 7, 
11 and 13 cases. 
Note also that the requirements are directed to a "small business 
debtor" not "small business case." Section 308(b) begins "A small 
business debtor shall ... " 
The § 101 ( 51 )CC) definition of "small business case" includes 
the limiting language "filed under Chapter 11." The § 101(51)(0) 
definition of "small business debtor" is not so expressly limited. 
It can be argued that since § 101(5l)(D) refers to § 1102 that a 
"small business debtor" can only be a Chapter 11 debtor and that § 308 
can only apply in Chapter 11 cases. And, it can be argued that placing 
the reporting requirements in Chapter 3 and using the term "small 
business debtor" means that the reporting requirements can apply in 
Chapter 7 cases and Chapter 13 cases in which the debtor is "engaged in 
commercial or business activities" and has debts of "no more than $2 
million." And, yet again, it would seem that a technical amendment 
moving the reporting requirements to Chapter 11 could easily eliminate 
the arguments.78 
4. Reclamation 
Finally, consider the BAPCPA provisions on reclamation placed 
in § 546( c ). Section 546 is surrounded by avoiding powers, which have 
the effect of increasing what is available to the estate by decreasing the 
rights of a particular creditor.79 And, § 546 is entitled "Limitations on 
avoiding powers." 
78. 11 U.S.C. § 308 (2005). If filing requirements for a small business debtor were 
changed to requirements for a "small business case" and were moved from § 308 to 
Chapter 11 then the number "308" could be used for what is now § 1514. 11 U.S.C. § 
1514 (2005). That section sets out the procedure for giving a "foreign creditor" notice in a 
"case under this title." Id. In other words, section 1514 applies in Chapter 7, 11 and 13 
cases. Id. In fairness, section 103(k)(l) so provides, but is it fair to expect attorneys to 
catch that the first time around? 11 U.S.C. § 103(k)(l) (2005). 
79. See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 613 (Foundation 
Press 1997) ( 1997). 
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Until BAPCP A, that was the right place for the Bankruptcy 
Code provision on reclamation because that provision simply 
acknowledged "any common law or statutory right of reclamation" and 
limited the use of the Bankruptcy Code avoiding powers on such non-
bankruptcy reclamation rights. In structure and effect, § 546, before 
BAPCPA, was similar to § 553 which acknowledges a nonbankruptcy 
right of setoff and limits the use of avoiding powers on such 
nonbankruptcy rights.80 
The "old" and BAPCPA versions of§ 546( c) are set out below: 
( c) Except as provided in subsection ( d) of this section 
the rights and powers of a trustee under section 544(a), 
545, 547, and 549 of this title are subject to any 
statutory or common law right of a seller of goods that 
has sold goods to the debtor, in the ordinary course of 
such seller's business, to reclaim such goods if the 
debtor has received such goods while insolvent, but 
(1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless 
such seller demands in writing reclamation of such 
goods-
( A) before 10 days after receipt of such goods by the 
debtor, or 
(B) if such 10 day period expires after the 
commencement of the case, before 20 days after receipt 
of such goods by the debtor, and 
(2) the court may deny reclamation to a selle with such a 
right of reclamation that has made such a demand only if 
the court-
(A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as a claim 
of a kind specified in section 503(b) of this title, or 
(B) secures such claim by a lien.81 
The "new" § 546( c) of BAPCP A reads: 
(c)(l) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this 
80. Id. at 406-12. 
81. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(l998) amended by 11 U.S.C. 546(c) (2005). 
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section and in section 507(c), and subject to the prior 
rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or 
the proceeds thereof, the rights and powers of the trustee 
under sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 are subject to 
the right of a seller of goods that has sold goods to the 
debtor, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, 
to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such 
goods while insolvent, within 45 days before the date of 
the commencement of a case under this title, but such 
seller may not reclaim such goods unless such seller 
demands in writing reclamation of such goods-
( A) not later than 45 days after the date of receipt of 
such goods by the debtor; or 
(B) not later than 20 days after the date of 
commencement of the case, if the 45-day period expires 
after the commencement of the case. 
(2) If a seller of goods fails to provide notice in the 
manner described in paragraph ( 1 ), the seller still may 
assert the rights contained in section 503(b )(9). 82 
83 
First, the reference to "statutory or common law" has been 
eliminated.83 Recall that until BAPCPA, the right of reclamation that 
existed in bankruptcy was derivative of state law - more specifically of 
the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-702 which generally imposed a ten-
day limit on reclamation. 84 By eliminating the reference to "statutory or 
common law" and by stating that the seller has forty-five days in which 
to act, Congress seems to have created a new bankruptcy right of 
reclamation that is greater than any right of reclamation under non-
bankruptcy law. 
Of course, there is nothing in § 546 or the legislative history that 
expressly indicates that Congress intended to create a new, independent 
82. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (2005). 
83. See supra notes 81 & 82 and accompanying text. There is a new reference to an 
exception in§ 507(c). § 507(c). That is probably another proofing error. That section deals 
with the priority of claims of governmental units. The exception should probably refer to § 
507(b) which concerns failed adequate protection rights. Id. 
84. See generally Craig M. Geno & Meade W. Mitchell, Basic Principles of Bankruptcy 
and State Reclamation, 18 MISS. C.L.REv. 443 (1998). 
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right of reclamation. And, of course, there is again the noscitur a sociis 
(or "what is a nice girl like you doing in a place like this") argument. 
The rest of § 546, like the title suggests, simply limits the use of 
avoiding powers with respect to claims, rights, and interests that exist 
outside of bankruptcy. And, the rest of the sections surrounding § 546 
reduce the rights of a particular party to increase the rights of the estate 
instead of creating new independent rights in sellers. 
If§ 546(c) creates a new, non-derivative right of reclamation, 
what are the limits on that right? More specifically, can the seller 
reclaim the goods not only from its customers but also from its 
customers' customers? 
The answer to this question under prior law was "no." Under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, the major piece of nonbankruptcy 
legislation governing reclamation, "The seller's right to claim . . . is 
subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith 
purchaser under this article(§ 2-403)".85 
The answer under BAPCP A § 546( c) is not "no" but instead, 
once again, "I don't know." If BAPCPA creates an independent right of 
setoff, then the UCC's limits on reclamation are irrelevant. BAPCPA § 
546(c) expressly recognizes that a seller's reclamation rights are 
subordinate to the rights of a holder of security interest in the same 
goods but does not mention the rights of a buyer of the goods. Under 
the doctrine of expresio unius exclusio alterius, .... 86 
My resort to Latin maxims is probably attributable to watching 
re-runs of HBO's Rome. 87 I would have been better served by re-
reading (reading?) Shakespeare's Julius Casear: 
Cassius: Did Cicero say any thing? 
Casca: Ay, he spoke Greek. 
Cassius: To what effect? 
85. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (2005). 
86. State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) ("The maxim expresio 
unius est exclusion alterius is often employed in the construction of statutes. In general, it 
means that a statute's inclusion of a specific limitation excludes all other limitations of that 
type"); see also Mich. Citizens for an lndep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1293 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("For example, if Congress banned the importation of apples, oranges, and 
bananas from a particular country, the canon of expresio unius est exclusion alterius might 
well indicate that Congress did not intend to ban the importation of grapefruits."). 
87. Rome, http://www.hbo.com/rome, (last visited December 19, 2005). 
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Casca: Nay, an I tell you that, I'll ne'er look you i' the 
face again; but those that understood him smiled at one 
another and shook their heads; but, for mine own part, it 
was Greek to me. 88 
85 
Congress spoke "Greek" in BAPCPA. Technical amendments 
would help. And commercial lenders need this help in making the 
"whom do you trust" decisions they regularly make. 
IV.AND WHOM Do COMMERCIAL LENDERS TRUST 
The question of whom Congress trusts is a question asked and 
answered by academics. 89 The question of whom lenders to businesses 
trust is a question asked and answered daily by commercial bankers in 
deciding whether and how to do new credit transactions and what if 
anything to do about existing, troubled credit transactions. And, the 
possible effect of bankruptcy and the bankruptcy laws is a part - not the 
most important part, but a part - of answering that question. 
BAPCP A affects how commercial creditors answer that 
question. BAPCP A can be seen as a double "win" for consumer 
creditors. First, BAPCPA makes it more difficult for consumer debtors 
to file for bankruptcy. Second, BAPCPA makes it more difficult for 
consumer debtors with meaningful income or assets to leave bankruptcy 
with as much of that income or assets. 
It is harder to see how BAPCP A will be a win for secured 
lenders.90 BAPCPA does not make it harder for business debtors -
88. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, SC. 2. 
89. Professor Elizabeth Warren of the Harvard Law School might answer that question 
"Citibank, MNBA and their lobbyists." Elizabeth Warren, Show Me the Money, N.Y. TIMES, 
October 24, 2005 at A2 l ("ls there celebration in the halls of Citibank this week. Is MNBA 
uncorking the Champagne ... Last Monday, the law they lobbied for went into effect."); 
Professor David A. Skeel, Jr. of the University of Pennsylvania Law School might answer 
that question "Wall Street" and "investment bankers." See David A. Skeel, Jr., Deja vu All 
Over Again in American Corporate Bankruptcy?, 79 ANNuAL MEETING OF THE NAT. CONF. 
OF BANKR. JUDGES 12-7, 12-11, 12-17 (2005). 
90. Contra Alan M. Christenfeld & Shepherd W. Melzer, 2005 Bankruptcy 
Amendments. A Secured Creditor's Perspective, N.Y.L.J. August 4, 2005 ("The overall 
tenor of the Act is to make bankruptcy, including Chapter 11, less hospitable to debtors and 
to reduce a debtor's powers while it is in bankruptcy. This would appear at first blush to 
help secured creditors.") Professor Melissa B. Jacoby of the University of North Carolina 
School of Law is, appropriately enough, more professional in her assessment: 
Legal and sociological research suggests that the bill's impact will be 
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individuals or business entities - to file for bankruptcy. Instead, 
BAPCP A arguably makes it harder for business debtors to reorganize in 
Chapter 11, and BAPCP A provides new recoveries and rights for 
employees, landlords, utilities, and vendors that will inevitably reduce 
what is available to secured lenders. 
As Wynonna should have sung at the NBCJ "Final Night 
Dinner" in San Antonio: 
Tom Dunn,91 I tell me bout the good old days I 
Sometimes it feels just like I Congress has gone crazy I 
Tom Dunn, I take me back before BAP C P) A I 
When how an 11 would turn out I 
Didn't seem so hazy 
Did debtors ever simply stay 
In leases after the two-ten day? I 
Were confidences something committees kept I 
Not something they must say? I 
Did key executives never really go away I 
Because of the KERPS 11 debtors pay? I 
Oh, Tom Dunn, I tell me about the good old days. I 
filtered through the influence of day-to-day actors in the bankruptcy 
system. As in the past, this filtering may mute or magnify certain 
statutory changes and may produce variation around the country. 
Assessments of the impact of formal changes are incomplete without 
taking this filtering into account. 
Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminancy of Statutory 
Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 169, 170 (2005). 
91. "Tom Dunn" is, of course, J. Thomas Dunn, Jr., the prominent North Carolina 
attorney who, along with the prominent Florida attorney Leonard Gilbert, invited me to 
speak at the Banking Institute. I understand that Wynonna's version of the song uses the 
word 'Grandpa' instead of "Tom Dunn." I also understand that people in North Carolina 
generally think "Grandpa" when they see Tom. And, I know that you understand that the 
reasons that I used "Tom Dunn" in the song instead of "Leonard Gilbert" are that (l) "Tom 
Dunn" works better in the rhyme scheme than "Leonard Gilbert" and (2) Tom is a lot older 
than Leonard and (3) Leonard's firm has referred more business than Tom's firm. 
